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Reason and Agency in Kant and
Fichte
Michael Vater
1 This paper explores the question of the unity of Transcendental Idealism at the end of
Eighteenth Century German philosophy,  given that it  circulated in different versions,
Kant’s  Critique  [of  humans’  rational  powers]  and  Fichte’ System  of  Science  [
Wissenschaftslehre]. Kant invoked the normative character of reason to address two issues
in  the  manifest  image  of  humanity:  the  presumed  objectivity of  cognition  and  the
universality of behavioral rules. Fichte invokes the spontaneity of agency to sculpt a global
account  of  human  existence,  one  that  makes  activity  fundamental  and  cognition
derivative.1 It is difficult to imagine the uproar this caused to the pre-Darwinian mindset
of Fichte’s readers and students; recall how Goethe has Faust read the Bible’s creation
story  as:  “In  the  beginning  was  the  deed.”  Yet  Fichte’s  insurgent  activism is  but  a
potentiation of Kant’s Copernican Revolution—solving the problem of the objectivity of
empirical knowing through the intellectual powers of the subject—or ‘Copernicus2’. Both
thinkers take the transcendental turn. They base conceptual investigations not on facts
or empirical evidence, but on the possibility of a situation; they are idealists since they
look  inward  to  the  spontaneity  of  the  agent/knower  for  explanation,  not  the
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environment,  stimulus, or  sensory  given.  Reason  can  fathom  only  what  it  has
constructed.
2 The differences between Kant’s and Fichte’s system of critical idealism I consider fall into
those explicitly noted by Fichte and those that deal with the form of a philosophical
system or its method. Fichte’s major criticisms of Kant are:
• Kant  critiqued  reason’s  cognitive  and  legislative  powers,  using  items  borrowed  from
experience,  whereas  he  (Fichte)  constructs  a  system  of  human  capacities  based  on  the
internal evidence of freedom or agency (FTP 80; WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 325).
• Though Kant says that freedom is the center of Critique and that practical reason is primary,
he only explains cognition—or representation,  as  in Reinhold’s  Element Philosophy (FTP
162-63; WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 362-63).
• Retaining  a  substance  ontology  while  advancing  a  phenomenalistic  theory  of  cognition
commits Kant to dubious entities like things in themselves, and forces him to separate the
sensible from the supersensible (FTP 271-72; Wlnm-K, GA IV/3, 430). 
3 The context of these criticisms is as important as their substance: Fichte voices them as a
confederate  of  Kant  who  wishes  to  correct  his  flaws  and  set  a  higher  standard  of
consistency for transcendental idealism. Accordingly, he tries to fashion the fragment
into a system, make reason consistently practical (or practical-theoretical), and banish
the traces of Kant’s commitment to the ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of the manifest image—
making  the  empirical  world  of  interacting  subjects  and  objects  the  end-point of  a
transcendental construction, not its starting point. Fichte’s systematization is generally
faithful to Kant’s views on cognition and morality, but as in Spinoza’s reformulation of
Cartesian  dualism,  the  clarity  and  logical  rigor  that  formalization  imports  produces
something  at  least  optically  different.  Kant’s  informal  rhetoric  imports  the  manifest
image, with its quotidian persons and things, into theory even when he wants to explore
impersonal cognitive mechanisms or pre-personal sorts of intelligence and agency.
4 I see two other points of differences between Kant and Fichte which follow from their
decisions about the starting- and end-points of philosophical theory. 
• Kant’s  approach  to  philosophy  is to  offer  a  synoptic  description  from  the  third-person
stance; it tacitly depends on a conventional view of things and persons. Fichte’s construction
is  genetic,  not  argumentative;  it  offers  a  temporal  narrative,  really  a  performance--a
product of poesy, not of prose. In Fichte’s view, Kant “considers the I only as ordering the
manifold, and not as producing the same” (FTP 261-62; WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 424).
• Both  thinkers  claim  to  use  ‘synthetic  method’.  Kant  expounds the  synthetic  nature  of
consciousness in a stepwise or combinatory manner, so his synthetic method is ascending.
For Fichte, synthesis is present from the start in its most radical form, antinomy or the
direct  joining  of  opposites.  Conceptual  analysis  unravels  the  contradiction,  so  for  him
synthetic method is descending (FTP 394-96; WLnm-H, GA IV/2, 232-233; WLnm- K GA IV/3,
486-87). 
 
Transcendental Idealism
5 Fichte  acknowledged  Kant’s  lead  in  pointing  to  the  resolution  of  philosophy’s  chief
problem: the justification of the claim of empirical cognition to objectivity, or in Fichte’s
terms, establishing the “necessity of our representations.” In the struggle to elaborate his
position, Kant encountered persistent misunderstanding of his two key arguments, the
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ideality of space and time, the formal frameworks of intuition, and the mind-furnished
character of the concepts and judgments that supported meaningful predications about
the structure of appearance. Goaded by critics’ misapprehension of the first Critique as a
metaphysical idealism akin to Berkeley’s,2 Kant rewrote sections of the work to show that
only through the supposition of integrative work in the knowing subject could sensations
be combined into perceptions of properties, and properties be combined into judgments
about objects. Mind furnishes the formal glue that holds together the data furnished by the
world--taking ‘mind’ and ‘world’ in a weak sense where they indicate only the poles of
spontaneity and passivity inside a representation (or figurative mental event). Kant used
reworked portions of the Analytic to make clear that synthetic judgments require only
potential integration of their contents under a logical subject (an empty “I think”) and
that  such  judgments  have  purchase  only  when  applied  to  experience. He  used  the
reworked Preface to make the subtler point that his idealism is purely hypothetical and 
heuristic: mind can understand only what conforms to its logical intent, or what it has
‘constructed’. Just as Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomies rely on similar observations,
but reach less or more accurate predictions depending on whether they assume the earth
or  the  sun  as  the  center  of  the  planetary  system,  so  commonsense  philosophy  and
transcendental idealism reach more or less reliable judgments about empirical reality
depending  on  whether  they  call  on  logic  or  on  ‘self-standing’  facts  to  explain  the
‘conformity’ of objectivity and subjectivity that truth involves. Although everyone starts
by  supposing  subjects  depend  on  objects  for  truth,  no  one  can  find  a  path  from a
supposed ‘outer’ to ‘inner’ to guarantee the transfer of information, and philosophers are
beset by doubts about sensory inputs and concept formation—until a Copernican reversal
of  frameworks shows that  working knowledge is  a  tango of  mind and world,  not  an
immaculate perception delivered by Instagram (KrV, B xvi-xxii).
6 Kant did not set out to prove our knowledge is certain, for no idea is clear enough, and no
impression vivid enough to breach the wall between ‘inside’ and ‘outside.’ Subject and
object form a categorial dyad, everywhere together because everywhere apart; no single
point permits a leap from one order to the other, since they occur together or not at all.
What  is  needed  to  quiet  the  skeptic  and  settle  the  debate  between  empiricists  and
rationalists is an argument that knowledge is reliable or affords accurate predictions--one
that  shows  how  reports  about  what  happens  are  not  just  habitually  believed,  but
operatively true.  Understanding authorizes justified beliefs  about experience or what
goes  on  in  the  world.  It  also  authorizes,  thought  Kant,  our  moral  convictions—the
conviction we that should have moral convictions, and even identical convictions about
what should and should not be done, and what can or cannot be permitted.
7 So, for Kant reason’s business is to warrant what is true and what is obligatory, each of
which compels  our  attention because it  involves  lawfulness  (and so  universality  and
necessity). Kant’s Critique comes down to two theses, held to be constitutive of reason
and not at all discretionary: 
I. Reason,  in  its  logical  or  ordering  function,  compels  our  belief  in  the  objectivity  of
experience because it has assembled the elements of cognition (intuitions and concepts)
according to the sole conceivable lawful patterns.3 
II. Because it  is  authoritative,  reason does not  inspect  experience for  patterns of  useful  or
beneficent conduct, but merely frames a formal standard for whatever patterns might be
suggested. It legitimates only such laws that can command everyone’s obedience.
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8 In  the  first  case,  reason’s  power  is  logical,  the  ability  to  combine  or  synthesize
representations a priori or on its own authority; its most powerful concepts are that of
causality and causal interaction among substances. In the second, its power to authorize
conduct  is freedom  or  causality  from  pure  concepts,  in  a  nonsensible  order  (CPrR
183-84). The reality of freedom is not explicable, but co-extensive with one’s perception
of the moral law or with one’s sense of citizenship in a moral order. A third Critique
explores  cases  where  reason  seems  to  advise  an  integration  of  knowledge  or  a
harmonization of interests wider than what it would compel in the name of truth or duty,
and this power is reflection.
9 As a self-proclaimed discoverer of new lands, Kant had to elaborate the foundations of
Criticism gradually, a task that consumed more than twenty years. It was not the task of
amplifying,  emending,  or  extending  transcendental  philosophy  that  made  the  task
difficult,  but  its  central  discovery:  while  intellect  (reason  as  understanding)  can
comprehend only what can fit into the explanatory architecture of causal explanation,
freedom (causality in another order) is completely incomprehensible to it. And while the
moral point of view urges that duty and responsibility presume freedom--the ability to
assess or conform conduct to some concept of conduct rather than brute response to
sensory stimulus--there is no way of demonstrating that any rational being acts in this
way.  Reason’s  chief  stumbling  block  in  the  theoretical  domain,  the  antinomy  that
advances contradictory valid arguments for both freedom and determinism, becomes its
signal achievement in the practical. Despite the susceptibility of every agent’s conduct to
analysis in terms of motivation or self-interest, practical reason addresses commands to
an agent whose deed is supposed to result in something other than what can appear in
the sensible world. Therefore, if reason is to speak in one voice, it must yoke together
both logic and freedom (CPrR 215-216).
 
Kant on the Root of Cognition
10 Kant and Fichte assume that human cognition and the moral regulation of behavior both
involve mind’s activity or the effects of it, not just a passive assimilation of content or
rules furnished from elsewhere. Kant tends to subsume action to cognition, figuring both
the works of nature and the acts of free beings as specimens of causality, while Fichte
offers a more provocative construction of cognition based on original or unconstrained
activity.  Kant  starts  with  a  basic,  but  ready-at-hand  item  (the  presentation)  where
activity  and  product  are  jointly  present,  but  only  as  past  static  factors  rather  than
dynamic tendencies, sidestepping the more basic question of how a mental state can depi
ct or stand for something other than what it is.4 By contrast, Fichte tries to describe how
a mental state comes into being with its polar features of spontaneity and passivity and
the logical capacity to merge them into a determinate state. This happens in a move that
is both first act and first acquisition of content: an inchoate agent doubles its features—
what it is and what it is not—through an unconstrained (or free) choice and makes the
logically first choice of deciding to be something rather than nothing, thus moving from
indeterminacy  to  a  determinate  state.  All  further  content  (and  knowing  of  content)
evolves through repetition of this basic choice or act. In Fichte’s language, Kant’s account
starts with fact, his with act.
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11 It will take me effort to flesh out the comparison. As I view it, the two thinkers defend the
same formal structure (synthetic a priori judgment) at the basis of experiential cognition,
but  they do it  in  different  philosophical  styles.  Kant  offers  an essentialist  or  account
inscribed in a synoptic table of rational capacities. Fichte offers a functionalist account,
embedded in a Bildungsroman narrative which pretends to be the autobiography of reason.
Let us start with Kant.
12 Like most contemporary writers, Kant uses the philosophical treatise to convey his views. It
combines  patches  of  exposition  prefaced  by  definitions  with  specific  arguments;  the
ensemble functions as one argument. Kant insists that one can assess this philosophy only
by looking to the quality or explanation (or coherence) it achieves, for its hypothesis that
mental processes are ingredient in the constitution of objects as objective runs contrary
to  the  complex  of  beliefs  about  persons  and  things  we  call  the  manifest  image.  A
transcendental  supposition  cannot  be  supported  by  specific  points  of  evidence.  The
Transcendental  Aesthetic  and  Logic  describe  the role  of  sensation  and  concept  in
cognition from a formal point of view. It is only in view of their relational properties that
these items can be combined or interrelated in judgment; any specific sensation will have
idiosyncratic  content,  likewise  any  specific  empirical  concept.  If  cognition  rests  on
combination—either of sensations in perceptions or various perceptions and concepts in
predication--it must be the mind-furnished elements (relational frameworks) that permit
their sorting, classifying, and identifying. The objects of experience present themselves as
finished  and  self-subsisting  only  through  mind-furnished  forms  of  intuition  and
conceptual judgment. There is no other way of explaining the fit of our senses and our
logic to the world experience presents.
13 The Analytic of the Critique is generally thought to have four stages, with treatments of:
• the relational continua (space, time) that frame sensory content and allow sensations to be
located,
• the properties of concepts that make perception possible and patterns of judgment that
make predication possible, 
• a first pass at unifying intuitions and concepts using schemata or concepts patterned to the
durations of various parts of the perceptual process, 
• and a retrospective enunciation of principles for empirical cognition.
14 The ensemble makes the argument that we understand a world of objects only by viewing
the work of intuition, imagination, and judgment as informing by the synthetic formal (or
framing)  activity of  mind.  This  is  the tool-kit  that  reason brings to experience,  with
whose help a reliable world of objective knowledge can be assembled. Since reason is both
architect and contractor on this project, the resulting artifice is not only objective but
normative. For Kant, knowledge is not aggregation of fact, or a history of trial and error
attempts  to  find  regularity  and  significance  in  life  (myth,  ritual,  and  magic);  it  has
necessity or normative traction because it is founded on patterns of thinking that could
not  be  thought  otherwise.  I  have  set  out  the  Analytic’s  argument  as  a  list  not  to
summarize  its  contents,  but  to  bring  Kant’s  narrative  strategy  to  light.  Although
cognition is through and through synthetic—structured by the unifying and concretizing
work  of  transcendental  imagination—Kant’s  exposition  is  a  linear  narrative,  like  the
conventional examples of viewing a house or a boat coming down river which are offered
in the Analogies.
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15 Fichte has identical beliefs about cognition, but starts from the existing synthesis of deed
(or agility) and fact in consciousness, analyzes that synthesis into its opposing factors,
and then further widens the contrast into an absolute antithesis or antinomy (FTP 371, K
477;FTP 427-28, K 500).5 These expository strategies look different, but each does the only
thing that can be done to explain something: display the totality of conditions that allow
it to arise as a unique item--Kant’s as the anatomist of human cognition, Fichte’s as the
field biologist.
16 But discussing the levels of synthesis or Kant employs says little about the content that is
integrated.  Each item that  is  sensed,  perceived,  conceptualized or  judged must  have
properties which make it amenable to such treatment: logical and epistemic characters
that (a) make this intuition or concept a case of knowing, and (b) permit its integration
into a more complicated instance form of cognition. All content must be alike; it must
have structure, and commensurate structure, to fit into the imaginative (or judgmental)
calculus.
17 For Kant, the generic unit of cognition is the Vorstellung, a placing of something before the
mind or a mental  presentation.6 At the generic level,  ‘mind’  means only a joining of
something known to a knowing. The unit of cognition is already complex, composed of
formal and material  elements;  the formal element is credited to spontaneity (forming,
unification), the material element to passivity (raw content, or other presentations taken
as content). Even at the basic level, a presentation is a self-enclosed and self-generated
little world, with subjective and objective poles or directions, themselves not entities but
shadows of the constitutive features of spontaneity and passivity. There is no ultimate or
atomic  presentation;  whatever  is  at  hand  as  a  presentation  is  a  presentation  of
presentations, already figured or unified into a cellular or self-sufficient cognition-entity.
Any more structured cognition will be a dense constellation of representations, and as the
description of cognition shifts from sensations to perceptions and from perceptions to
concepts and judgments,  the more spontaneity comes to the fore and the more form
predominates over matter or content.
18 Current research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience makes similar assumptions,
viewing intelligence as a function of iterated simple cognitive competencies, not a single
power of consciousness. To read Kant in this light helps banish the whiff of substantialism
or anthropomorphism that lingers around his account of cognition. If Critique takes away
the possibility of  knowing supersensible objects,  it  equally removes the possibility of
knowing sensible subjects or objects in themselves, outside the continuum of experience
and the multiple voices/visions that constitute it. On any idealistic account, Critical or
metaphysical, we can with certainly know only how we know, not what.
19 Kant is generally satisfied to treat a presentation as an entity, to call it an ‘appearance’
but figure it as a thing, and so to view the relation between it and whatever grounds it as
a real relation, not one merely ideal or embedded in the project of cognition. Because he
does not plumb the structure of presentation, Kant tends to treat the presentation as a
ready-made thing and falls into the idea that there must be a thing behind appearance, a
thought-thing behind an appearing thing--a transcendental object behind appearances. In
the manifest image, it’s a useful mistake to think that what appears in the mirror is an
image of me, but complete folly to think there is another person behind the glass.
20 Reinhold attempted to think his way to the bottom of Kant’s epistemology in his New
Essay on the Human Capacity of Representation. Inspecting the presentation’s elements, he
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identified two chief features, one whereby it offers some contents (a given that is also a
manifold)) and another that does the depicting (a spontaneous unification of that manifold).7
These  features  are  functions  of  the  free-standing  presentation,  quasi-logical  or  -
mathematical functions, not linked to a thing-in-itself or subject-in-itself. This cognitive
atom,  like  the  Leibnizian  monad,  has  the  powers  of  signification  and  combination—
signification (depiction) arising from the passive, material element, combination arising
from the spontaneous, formal element.8 Although Reinhold tries to explain the increase
in logical power as one ascends from presentation to intuition, to concept, to judgment
(all iterations of the same structure), one can see another route: to isolate the mark of
spontaneity and figure it not as just a component feature of a presentation, but as an
agency or ‘mover’ that constructs the presentation. 
21 Fichte pursues such an agent-centered approach, particularly in the second iteration of
his Jena transcendental  philosophy.  Kant dismissed his first  attempt as “mere logic,”
perhaps  misled,  as  many  readers  were,  by  the  Grundlage’s  initial  presentation  of
consciousness’s synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity as ‘principles’.9 Spontaneity was
but one of the marks that Kant ascribed to the presentation, but it is predicated of the
whole  of  the  monadic  thought-entity,  taken  as  finished  and  self-sufficient.  In  the
Transcendental  Logic,  the  conceptual  facet  of  cognition  is  put  in  terms  of  logical
properties and processes, not of agents and products. Imagination, for instance, is a global
feature of cognitive processing, unification of content or distillation of a representative
instance from an unspecified multitude.10 In the A-Deduction,  it  is  parsed into three
episodes  of  functions:  perceptual  apprehension  or  synopsis  content,  reproduction  of
temporally past content in the current flow of experience, and recognition of the concept
in concept-formation. It is not altogether clear whether there is a single feature in the
three that makes them ‘imagination,’ or whether it is only family resemblance that unites
these ways of taking what is multiple as one or distilling many cases into a representative
instance. It is not even clear that imagination is a specific mental function, or where it
finds its place in Kant’s general definition of cognition as a unification of intuition and
concept. Perhaps it is the ‘image’ in the English translation’s rendering of Einbildungskraft
that confuses English-speakers; Einbildung seems to directly indicate logical unification—
or the ability to simultaneously be on both sides of a significant difference.
22 I think the fact that the rewrite of the B-Deduction simply omits reference of imagination
and speaks instead of already-unified presentations being accompanied by (or able to be
accompanied by) an abstract mark of judgment, the representation “I think” is telling.
Kant’s  transcendental  story  need  not  be  anthropomorphic,  though  it  is  indeed
mentalistic. His use of the phrase: “the I, he, or it in me that thinks” (KrV A364/B404) says
plainly enough he is talking about logical functions—and that the minimal language of
mental  functions  is  sufficient  for  transcendental  thinking.  Impersonal  functionalist
language seems appropriate for mere thinking: it matters not a whit whether you or I or a
logic bot parses a tautology or produces a formal proof of a theorem of the predicate
calculus. The logical subject is a pretty boring fellow. The display of objects for a subject is
just  the  pinnacle  of  a  stack  of  logical  operations,  the  projection  of  a  logical,  not  a
Cartesian, theater. It will take a complete account of consciousness such as Fichte crafts
to see whether the logical spectator can be attached to agent who has learned responsible
behavior. The question may have more than anthropological significance. The normative
or law-bound procedures of cognition may carry one form of necessity, and the moral
necessity to performing the duty that one can intuits in one’s situation another. Kant
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presumed that reason is one, its legislation uniform, its decrees equally compelling in
logic and life. Fichte set out to prove it. 
 
Fichte’s Account of Agency
23 One can appreciate Fichte’s desire to continue Kant’s transcendental philosophy and how
he wishes to alter it by considering two criticisms he advances early in the nova method
lectures:
• Kant’s Critique probed the fitness of finite reason, established its competence in empirical
cognition and moral legislation, forbade its extension to the supersensible and stipulated
that philosophy’s task was to systematically display of reason’s contents. But Critique could
only be prologue to System, whose real task is to present reason’s evolution in its own voice
(FTP 80, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 325).
• Kant’s  asserted  the  primacy  of  practical  reason,  or  the  strength  of  reason’s  interest  in
resolving  the  antinomy  of  freedom  and  determinism  in  favor  of  freedom  (FTP  162-63,
WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 371). But in doing so, he only added another sort of reason to theoretical
reason, one that took the coin of moral necessity as equal in value to truth or epistemic
necessity. 
24 To overcome these deficiencies, Fichte sees he must abandon the philosopher’s armchair
and find a stage where reason can display its basic function as an actor or agent and still
serve as its own commentator. Spinoza’s and Reinhold’s efforts to formalize philosophical
argument inspire his attention to detail and interconnection, but Fichte’s literary friends
who played with the walls convention had erected between author, artistic depiction, and
audience may also have nurtured the idea of producing reason’s autobiography. Only as
an agent can reason have a career or appear as actor in a narrative.
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Fichte’s entire construction. I will cover the
basic  story  of  agency’s  evolution into  subject-objectivity  and mark the  points  where
Fichte’s view agency undergirds objectivity seems to coincide with Kant’s transcendental
account of cognition. If that can be made clear, it will be clear that Kant spared himself
effort  in  speaking  from  the  armchair  and  introducing  just  a  few  transcendental
somersaults into the manifest ontology, while Fichte takes on a huge project in promising
a fully scientific account of the functions of finite reason (FTP 83-84). I will discuss only
three episodes: (1) agency’s first gig, (2) how it paints its habitat, or acquires an array of
material qualities, and (3) its split into subject and object.
 
The First Move
26 Fichte rarely speaks of reason as the agent in Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, but
typically of the I’s self-positing, i.e., of action, agent, and agency. Freedom effects its self-
substantiation; it is not a property or qualifier of a substance (FTP 83-85, WLnm-K, GA
IV/3, 326-328). I use the term agency to translate Agilität, employed by Fichte to indicate
(i) the mover or agent, (ii) its power to change state, from indeterminacy to determinacy,
and (iii) to reflect upon or react to that change. At the most basic level, the germ of
freedom or rational life in principio is a movement that initiates activity, but is reflexive or
self-evaluative, and so is responsible for what is done, not just as efficient cause but as
chooser. From its bare first moves, Fichte’s account of reason integrates freedom and
cognition: the agent’s first act is to qualify itself, i.e., move from indeterminacy or lacking
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all  quality to determinacy or having the bare quality of  having some quality.  In the
germinal world of agency, the first item of information—the being-something (along with
the awareness of that being-something) that will evolve into a cognition of a complexly
qualified something--is the first choice. One might think of Fichte’s first item as Hamlet
the transistor, pondering “to be (charged) or not to be, that is the question.” Others have
more artfully spoken of this situation, at once very simple and very complicated, as “the
original duplicity of intelligence and will”.11 A recent critic characterizes Fichte’s ethics as
more existentialist than Kantian, but I think Fichte knots together “whether to be?” and
“how to be?” from the first twitch of the string.
27 The difficulty  of  Fichte’s  first  move is  not  only  that  it  has  theoretical  and practical
directions, it is enunciated in a narrative so thin as to be barely intelligible, but so basic
that  it  undergirds  all  further  predication of  properties  and powers,  or  qualities  and
action: there is an initial movement of intuition from lacking any character to having
one--from indeterminacy to determinacy--and a simultaneous awareness of that process --a
slide from that lively state of intuition to its congealed result, concept (FTP 139, WLnm-K,
GA IV/3, 359-60). The fixed character or concept that results from this first movement
does  not  exhaust  agency,  but  it  constrains  further  movements  and  accretion  of
characters. It’s as if the logical and moral germ of the finite rational being were a self-
assembling set of toy blocks. Just as every block can be joined to every other because they
are identical in structure, every move or ‘action-block’ that agency deploys will be like
the first, a concept-property. Anything it does and any further quality it takes on will
have the same logico-practical character: it becomes x from being non-x because nothing
prevents  it,  but  once it  has  become x,  it  is  a  fixed character  or  concept.  All  marks,
character, qualities, properties and psychological/moral items such as striving, feelings,
desires, deliberations, choices etc. are compounded of such self-qualifying choices. Not until
the system reaches complicated levels like personal choice in social or intersubjective
contexts  does  the  self-constricting finitude  of  original  agency  become  apparent.
Prospectively, choice seems open or unconstrained, but retrospectively one must lie in
the bed one has made for oneself.
 
Feelings and Qualities
28 Kant was horrified by initial reviews of the Critique of Pure Reason that imputed a sort of
ontological idealism to him, with mind in some way responsible not just for logical form,
but sensory qualities as well. Idealists are aware that logic is a matter of relations, not of
predicates or functions that are so related, and Kant viewed the framework properties of
cognition as extensions of logical relations. The a priori appears to be a self-sufficient
domain. While he could remedy the reviewer’s misunderstanding by underscoring the
hypothetical character of the transcendental postulate, he still was left with no account
of the ‘thisness’ of sensory qualities other than the logical place-holder of a variable, with
the predicate or function specified from elsewhere. 
29 Fichte was not content to leave idealism a half-theory and so threw himself into the task
of deducing qualities, material and formal, on the basis of agency or determination via
choice.  He  found  two  ways  of  characterizing  qualities  or  properties  that  were  of
philosophical  interests.  (1)  Kant  had  suggested  the  first  feature--  that  perception
simultaneously indicates an object’s  quality and one’s  awareness of  it—by calling the
process  an  intuition  (Anschauung),  a  term that  connotes  the  subject’s  activity,  not  a
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passive reception.  Two centuries of  attempts by physics to discriminate primary and
secondary qualities formed a consensus that perception involves changes in both the
perceiver’s body and mind, or that a ‘quality’ involved a registering a change of state in
both. Fichte underlines the subjective or active element in intuition by using the term
feeling (Gefühl) to indicate what is sensed as well as the change in awareness by which it is
registered. Initially, this seems an odd move; as we usually talk in the manifest image,
perception mostly captures properties said to be external, so we pay little attention to
our awareness of it. This certainly is the case for visual qualities like brightness or color,
and for acoustic, gustatory and olfactory qualities which we project onto the object; only
in touch, where what is perceived (pressure on the skin or temperature) is displayed in or
on the body, do we call those qualities ‘feelings’. Or if what we perceived is a quality of
mind or indicates a change in mental state, that too is deemed feeling. No matter how we
usually speak, a philosophical (wissenschaftlich) account must indicate that what is given
in  the  perception  is  given  only  in  the  giving-and-taking  of  awareness:  all  sensible
qualities are things that affect us, for each one involves a change in mental awareness.
Even the properties we impute to things are (mediated by physiological and psychological
factors) felt items, modulations in our awareness (FTP 176-77, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 377). 
30 (2) We do not have feelings one by one, or additively, but a perceptual field or drive is an
orientation  to  a  system  of  feelings  or  logico-perceptual  options.  One  can  see  three
(according to Goethe), five (Buddhists), six, or seven (Newton) basic colors or roughly 17
billion in an 8-coded web display. One can hear high or low sounds, for short or long
intervals. One can discriminate salty, sweet, sour, bitter and umami on the tongue; hot,
cold, soft, or hard on the skin. The nose, I fear, is not so logical. On this physiological-
psychological basis, Fichte asserts that having a quality is a case of choosing a quality, or
making  a  determinate  choice  from  an  array  of  determinate  possibilities.  Bearing  a
property is an upshot of an evaluation and choice; being aware of a property is a function
of paying attention to how one is affected (FTP 178-180, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 378-79). Even
before consciousness arrives on the scene, is embodied and is placed in space and time
through causal  efficacy,  there is  an interactive aspect to perception and all  forms of
higher-order cognition. What we see logically depend on what we don’t see, or have in
some sense decided not to see. The focal or aleatory character of cognition arises from
the logic of characters (and predicates): to see a is not to see non-a (FTP 134, WLnm-K, GA
IV/3, 357). It is only at a higher and voluntary level of consciousness where Spinoza’s ‘all
determination is negation’ becomes confining or problematic. 
 
From Subject-Objectivity to Subjects and Objects
31 As far back as the 1770 Dissertation, Kant offered several piecemeal arguments for the ideal
nature of space and time, claiming they are the formal features of the sensible world,
independent of the categories of quantity. If abstracted as continua, they provide the
content  for  formal  operations  (judgments)  of  mathematics  and  the  constructions  of
geometry. Neither here nor in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique does Kant offer
a single sustained argument comparable to that of the Logic. Treating space and time as
ideal allows him to put their purely relational structures in the foreground; they are
continua of sorts, but, viewed in abstraction from quantitative concepts, vague ones. In
the  manifest  image,  we  commonly  take  space  and  time  as  containers  of  indefinite
proportions, ‘showrooms’ for the display of discrete sensible items. Kant seems to support
this ‘aquarium’ image. These frameworks, even if not compounded from granular lengths
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or durations, seem to subsist on their own, indifferent to objects ‘placed’ inside them. No
property or operation ties things to spatial-temporal frameworks, though the formality of
space and time connects to quantitative categories in a way that allows us to quantify and
measure the spread of perceived things in judgments. Perhaps this sensible-conceptual
connectivity that joins one form of relation to another is the work of imagination, e.g.,
the  productive  imagination of  the  A-Deduction,  but  this  does  not  tell  us  much,  since
Einbildungskraft is just unification (Einbildung).
32 In Fichte’s version of Transcendental Philosophy, there is no being that is not a seeing,
and no seeing that is not an exercise of reflexive agency.  The bundle of feelings the
agency has constructed to this point is not an amalgam of properties or perceptions, just
a direction or striving toward what emerges as the functions of intelligence and willing. At
a preliminary stage,  agency’s  product  must  endow itself  with the sensible  stretch of
spatial and temporal properties; only then can it take on the relative independence of
being a body (a substance in causal interaction with others) or being a will (an actor in an
interactive setting, whose agency is elicited by another). But the closer that agency gets
to actualizing its  key value of  self-sufficiency,  the more its  function is  hemmed in by
finitude and its being/willing reduced to modalities of being-alongside-another. Agency’s
logical program, to move from being nothing to being something, results in determinate
modes of being and willing spread over multitudes of individuals. And freedom (or the
coin of agency) gets restricted when it is realized, its normative force diluted in that it
encounters limitation instead of self-sufficiency. We cannot adequately address the issues
we mention here—why reason must be finite, why freedom must be intersubjective, and
why self-limitation as a substitute for self-sufficiency lies at the foundation of both law
and morality. When it arises, agency seems to be mine or my deed, a setting sail on an
ocean of freedom, but when it finds appropriate ‘somethings’ to do and to be, it trades
freedom for determinateness, and, like the modern consumer, finds itself smothered in
the ‘stuff’ of finitude.
33 On Fichte’s reading, agency or subject-objectivity does not merely insert itself into pre-
existing temporal or spatial structures. He gives them a four-step derivation, where the
contrast between free and reflective activity (or determining and determined agency)
drives the deduction. (1) Agency expresses itself as a dance of activity as such, pure space,
and free activity—figuratively expressed as the act of “drawing a line in space.” Where no
dimension is given and the range of motion is in no way restricted, all dimensions—the
three  of  conventional  perception  and  the  higher-order  spaces  that  current  physics
entertains—are possible. But there is no extension and no direction until a first action
and a first dimension are established--inscribing a line in space, or extending activity
until it has a dimension. Fichte’s reasoning seems arbitrary; perhaps it is a rebuttal of
Kant’s distinction between figurative synthesis, the unfolding of continuous phenomena,
and inner sense, the flow of consciousness (KrV B 154-55). (2) In an intensification of its
double  activities,  agency posits  itself  as  an activity  fitted  to  objectivity  (the  subject,
schematized) and an opposed object. Activity directed to the subject concentrates itself
into a point or ‘place’, and further free acts extend the spatial spread, so matter-space
become an infinitely divisible continuum. If that is freedom of willing, a corresponding
freedom of intellect collects feelings as properties of the object. Thus, space is filled, or
there is matter. (3) A further potentiation puts objects in space. Free activity posits the
rational being--“the practically striving being “-- as located in one place or working from
a point of view. All objects gain location, but only relative to the striving-and-perceiving
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subject,  and distance  between subject  and object  becomes  a  function of  the  activity
between them. (4) The activities mentioned, subjective and objective, are translated into
two forms of efficacy or force (FTP 238-46, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 412-416). We previously
mentioned the concentration of  inner  force which is  intuited as  place,  the origin of
location. On the objective side, physical force extends or extrudes the single point into a
continuous series, each member determined by its prior—the arrow of time. As so we
have space and time as functions of  freedom, agency,  willing,  causality—all  forms of
activity; quite different from Kant’s formal fishbowl.
34 We  cannot  follow  Fichte’s  further  steps  in  detail,  but  we  can  mention  two  general
directions. In a fourth section of his deduction, Fichte defined space materialized as the
condition of body, and body as the sole way that force can be expressed or will actualized.
When agency is made plural or fragmented into individual agents, bodies are the sole
vehicle that allows agents to interact. Shared or inter-subjectivity becomes a matter of
causal interaction among bodies, with an inferential decoding of the bodily gestures and
collisions between bodies mediating the freedom-and-limitation of living under law and
discerning the moral duties of one’s physical and social situation (FTP 302-304, WLnm-K,
GA IV/3, 444-45). A concluding section, oriented towards the object-body, outlines the
parameters of  agency in the body:  articulation,  the delegation of  specific functions to
specific organs or limbs, and organic functioning. The organism is the living embodiment of
normativity, and a clue for interpreting the social and moral interactions of individual
rational beings (FTP 458-62, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 514-516). This is truer for us now that we
have replaced ideas of top-down coordination for evolutionary or bottom-up design.
 
Is the I a Mirror or an Eye?
35 We have looked at Kant’s and Fichte’s versions of transcendental philosophy in some
detail.  The first offers a comprehensive investigation of the rational powers from the
outside, an objective description one that lends itself to synoptic presentation in a table.
Kant thought this way of stating his key moves and results in a table original and quite
apt.12 A  later-day  Kantian,  Michel  Foucault,  seizes  on  the  table  to  epitomize  the
intellectual thrust of the Enlightenment.13 In contrast, Fichte offers a ‘genetic deduction’,
a construction that threads the conditions of consciousness one by one on the string of
agency, and so produce a living image of consciousness in the process of constructing
itself. But aside from these differing modes of presentation, the systems are quite similar.
Fichte puts the basic difference this way:
The I, as described by previous philosophers, is a mirror. But a mirror does not see,
and this is why these philosophers are unable to explain “seeing” or intuition. All
they posit is the concept of mirroring. This remark reveals the basis of all the errors
of  other  philosophical  systems—the  Kantian  system  included.  The  error  can  be
rectified only by means of a correct concept of the I. The I of the Wissenschaftslehre 
is not a mirror; it is an eye […] Everything we see, we see within ourselves. We see
only  ourselves,  and  only  ourselves  as  acting,  only  as  passing  from  what  is
determinable to what is determinate (FTP 151-52, WLnm-K, GA IV/3, 365-66).
36 If  we view intellect’s  function as  primarily cognitive,  we might be satisfied with the
regularity and completeness of Kant’s tabular view of reason. If we view its function as
both cognitive and practical from the very start,  Kant’s fourfold tables of judgments,
categories,  schemata,  principle  and antinomies will  not  satisfy,  for  I  cannot  find the
rational subject inside the lists of cognitive concepts and functions, much less the agent
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who devises  and executes  a  life-plan  or  acknowledges  normative  constraints  on her
behavior.
37 There is another difference I can see, it is minor compared to the difference Fichte sees
between fact and act: one will get different views of reason’s authority (normativity) if one
describes it  as  the necessity derived from legislation or  as  the constraint  imposed by
having a goal--or by the ultimate goal, self-sufficiency (SE 58-61). In both cases, reason’s
work  is  directive  or  order-imposing,  categorical  or  compelling  in  domains  like  logic
(formal and transcendental), law and morality, hypothetical or advisory if a matter of
imposing  a  means-to-end  order  upon  one’s  conduct.  Reason  is  fundamentally
housekeeping, an order imposed by effort and requiring effort if it is to be maintained.
But  there  is  a  vast  difference  between  the  outward-directed  ordering  of  subsuming 
judgment and the self-direction of reflexion (SE 107, 112). It is the very nature of the I to be
self-reverting activity, the seed of both will and cognition (GA I/4: 272-73).
38 It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare Kant’s and Fichte’s moral theories, but I
should mention that while both appeal to duty as the prompt for ethical conduct, Kant’s
version of  duty  is  tied  to  his  concept  of  positive  freedom or  conduct  authorized by
universal  law,  while  Fichte  seems  to  understand  the  prompt  for  moral  conduct
situationally, involving the constraint that another will signifies for mine, or the force of
the interpersonal ‘summons’ that tells one to become what one must become (FTP 351-53,
451-53; WLnm-K GA IV/3, 467-79, 511-512 ).14
 
After Enlightenment: Metaphysics in a Minor Key
39 If skeptics and empiricists were not convinced by the argument of the Transcendental
Analytic, Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Dialectic about the unthinkability of
God, immortality and freedom did not persuade the rationalists. While we tend to read
Critical Idealism as having settled certain problem, Kant’s contemporaries saw him as
stirring  the  pot  of  current  debates.  Reinhold’s  initial  appreciation  of  transcendental
philosophy lavishes praise on Kant for having revived religious debates by stirring up
genuine  discussion,  as  if  the  anatomist  of  pure  reason  was  really  the  religious
provocateur Jacobi always hoped to be. Kant was clear, however, that he had at least
cleared away the ruins of past mistakes and thus made a genuine metaphysics possible.
40 What  Fichte’s  recasting  of  transcendental  philosophy  signaled,  however,  was  the
necessity of redoing intra-terrestrial or empirical metaphysics, for though Critique told
us we have to reconfigure all our knowledge as sciences of appearances, not of noumena
or  ultimate  items,  by  foregrounding  Aristotelean  relational  categories  an  implicit
ontology of things was left in place, and the manifest image of a world of self-contained
subjects and objects continued to sound, but in a minor or phenomenological key. Fichte
found he had to abandon the manifest image and for scientific purposes construct a free-
standing  account  of  a  world  of  agency  in  which  discrete  rational  beings  were  the
precipitates  of  an  ocean  of  swirling  acts  and  intentions,  a  world  where  the  most
important  cognitive  act  is  not  the  welding  together  of  classes  and  concepts  in  the
categorical  judgment but the “hovering before the mind” or entertaining of  goals  in
imagination that  mediates  every step of  the I’s  evolution.  The perspective of  agency
softens the contours of the world of appearances and exorcises the ghost of realism that
suggests picture theories both for logic and perception.
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41 If  there has been progress in metaphysics since Kant,  it  had been in revision of  the
categories of substance, essence, and causality as employed even in empirical contexts, and
their  replacement  with  ‘less  constructed’  ideas  such  as  functions  in  a  field,  minimal
conditions for naming something x, and clouds of conditions, most of them necessary, few
sufficient.  Evidently,  we cannot  do without terms for  what  is  happening or  tends to
happen,  for  figuring  out  minimum  standard  for  naming  something  or  consequently
treating it a certain way—when the question arises, e.g., whether animal intelligence is an
oxymoron or the beginning of a case for vegetarianism, or for discriminating between
statistical  correspondence  and  clinical  efficacy  in  testing  medical  treatments  or
pharmaceuticals. We can now appreciate exactly what we want to know when we ask
about entities, properties, and conditions. The older language of substance, essence, and
cause assumed that what played these roles was more unitary, independent, unchanging,
identifiable,  and  predictable  than  what  makes  something  a  discernible  entity,  or
minimally defines its properties, or states the conditions for it to arise. Fichte’s revision
of  transcendental  idealism  was  bold,  probably  too  obscure  in  its  statement  to  be
paradigm-altering, but certainly fertile in its basic suggestion that what goes on is more
fundamental than what we call things and that we close off our own possibilities when we
transform a world of lively goals, acts, desires and decisions into a drab market of things
and properties.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper explores the question of the unity of Transcendental Idealism at the end of Eighteenth
Century German philosophy, given that it circulated in different versions, Kant’s Critique [of
humans’ rational powers] and Fichte’ System of Science [Wissenschaftslehre]. Both thinkers take
the transcendental turn. They base conceptual investigations not on facts or empirical evidence,
but on the possibility of a situation; they are idealists since they look inward to the spontaneity
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of the agent/knower for explanation, not the environment, stimulus, or sensory given. Reason
can fathom only what it has constructed.
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